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MANAGING GREAT LAKES WATER DIVERSIONS:
A DIVERSION MANAGER'S VIEWPOINT
DANIEL A. INJERD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago the Great Lakes region geared up for a water fight
that never happened. The defensive build up began when a coal slurry
pipeline company included an option in a draft report that would have
directed approximately 11 million gallons per day (mgd) of Lake
Superior water to Gillette, Wyoming in order to transport coal from
Gillette to the Great Lakes region.! While that option was short-lived,
the region's efforts to establish a strong defense against diversions of
Great Lakes water continues to this day. Actions including, but not
limited to, political, institutional, legal, and technical maneuvers have
resulted in a bewildering array of policies, laws, activities, and
viewpoints on whether the Great Lakes region should manage or
prohibit new diversions of Great Lakes water.
Today the Great Lakes region stands at a crossroads. The Great
Lakes Charter,' which was signed by the eight Great Lakes states'
governors and two Canadian premiers in January 1985, established
criteria by which the region would review proposals for significant new
or increased diversions or consumptive uses. Less than one year later,
however, Congress passed section 1109 of the Water Resources
Development Act (WRDA) of 1986.' This section provided the governors
of each Great Lakes state with an absolute veto power over any new
diversion of region water out of the basin. Nevertheless, this legislation
neglected to include any criteria regarding diversion, size, for what
purpose the water would be diverted, or any other conditions upon which
* Chief, Lake Michigan Management Section, Division of Water Resources, Illinois
Department of Transportation. The viewpoints expressed here are those of the
author's and do not necessarily represent the position of either the Division of Water
Resources or the State of Illinois.
1. Great Lakes Governors Task Force, Water Diversion and Great Lakes Institutions:
A Report to the Governors and Premiers of the Great Lakes States and Provinces 4
(1985).
2. Id. at app. III.
3. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082
(1986Xcodified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2011 (1990)).
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to base a diversion decision.
This paper will discuss two proposals for out-of-basin diversion
since the adoption of the Charter and the passage of the WRDA. Both
propositions have been in favor of domestic water usage and have been
suggested by one of the Great Lakes states. The difficulty the Great
Lakes region experienced in reviewing these proposals clearly reveals
that the two managerial approaches of the Charter and the WRDA are
incompatible and yield inconsistent results when applied in similar
situations.
II. BACKGROUND
Until the 1980s, proposals for large-scale diversions of Great Lakes
water were handled through either direct negotiation between the
governments of the United States and Canada, as in the Long Lac/Ogaki
and Welland Canal diversions in Canada, or through litigation before
the United States Supreme Court, as in the Chicago diversion." The
1980s however brought a new realization that although the Great Lakes
represent a vast hydrologic system, the region needed to be managed as
a single entity. This recognition coincided with a general worsening of
the economic climate in the Great Lakes region, recently labelled as the
"rust belt." When the coal slurry pipeline issue became public, the
region's political response quickly declared that waters of the Great
Lakes were not for sale to other regions of the United States.' However,
political declarations did little to reassure the region's legal experts of
the region's ability to prevent an unwanted diversion of water to another
area of the country-nor was there anything in federal permit processes
to provide assurance that the Great Lakes states would be able to
intervene and halt an unwise diversion of region water. Finally, it was
also around this time that the U.S. Supreme Court issued its famous
Sporhase decision, reaffirming that states may not place a ban or
embargo on the interstate transfer of water.6
The region began to develop a plan for dealing with the possibility
of diversions. Because Congress possessed the authority to regulate
4. See DmsIoN OF WATER RESOURCES, ILL. DEP'T OF TRANSP., GREAT LAKES WATER
DIVERSIONS AND CONSUMPTIVE USES: CHARTING A COURSE FOR FUTURE PROTECTION,
A REPORT TO THE GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS (1983).
5. Id. at app. I. Appendix 1 contains the resolutions that were adopted on November
17, 1983 by the Council of Great Lakes Governors on diversions and consumptive
uses.
6. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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interstate commerce, the region's strategy was to seek federal legislation
requiring the concurrence of the Great Lakes states and the
International Joint Commission for any diversion of region water for use
outside of a Great Lakes state." At the same time, the Council of Great
Lakes Governors appointed a task force, ultimately leading to the
development of the Great Lakes Charter. The objective was to develop
a management program that would apply equally to diversions and
consumptive uses and would "conserve and protect the water resources
of the Great Lakes basin for the use, benefit, and enjoyment of all
citizens of the Great Lakes states and provinces."'
Although a detailed review of the Great Lakes Charter is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is significant that all eight Great Lakes
governors and the two Canadian premiers agreed that major diversions
and consumptive uses of Great Lakes basin resources (greater than 5
mgd average in any thirty day period) should be subject to regional
consultation procedures and criteria drafted in recognition of the
Commerce Clause, and court decrees such as the Sporhase decision.
At the federal level, legislation was introduced and attached to a
Water Resources omnibus bill (eventually becoming section 1109)
requiring the concurrence of the Great Lakes governors for any diversion
of region water for use outside a Great Lakes state."0 The legislation
was ultimately amended to provide that any Great Lakes diversion,
regardless of its destination, required the concurrence of all eight Great
Lakes governors. Thus, what began as complementary legislation to
strengthen the region's ability to resist the threat of a diversion for use
outside of a Great Lakes state now effectively rendered the Great Lakes
Charter process obsolete.
In 1987, a follow-up committee of the Council of Great Lakes
Governors prepared a more comprehensive prior notice and consultation
process for the region to utilize in reviewing diversion or consumptive
7. Several congressional initiatives were made in the 98th Congress. See H.R. 4366,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2026, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
8. GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 23.
9. Id. at app. HI.
10. See H.R 6, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1185 (1985); S. 1567, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §
337 (1985).
11. 134 Cong. Rec. S. 2865 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1986XAmend. by Sen. Metzenbaum
No. 1677).
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use proposals falling under the requirements for consultation in the
Great Lakes Charter. 2
III. GREAT LAKES DIVERSION MANAGEMENT: THE GREAT LAKES
CHARTER AND THE EFFECT OF SECTIoN 1109
A. Case Study: Pleasant Prairie, Wisconsin Diversion Proposal
On September 2, 1987, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson sent
correspondence to the other Great Lakes governors and premiers
requesting approval of a proposed diversion of Lake Michigan water for
the town of Pleasant Prairie. The town's groundwater supplies exceeded
federal standards for radioactivity, and, as a solution, proposed to
purchase Lake Michigan water from the nearby town of Kenosha. The
projected diversion (3.2 mgd) was well below the Great Lakes Charter
trigger level of 5 mgd, however, it did require approval of all the Great
Lakes governors pursuant to Section 1109 of the Water Resource
Development Act. Initially, efforts of the Council of Great Lakes
Governors' Water Resources Management Committee focused on the
implications Section 1109, requiring unanimous approval for any
diversion, imposed upon the Great Lakes Charter, and attempted to
resolve these differences. Once it became clear that an early resolution
would not be forthcoming, Wisconsin withdrew its proposal and
encouraged local officials to further investigate alternative approaches
to resolve their water supply problem. That search failed to uncover any
economical alternatives for Pleasant Prairie, therefore, Governor
Thompson again initiated the prior notice and consultation process
required under the Great Lakes Charter. A formal request including a
fact sheet describing the proposed diversion was drafted and signed by
the chairman of the Council of Great Lakes Governors. A formal
consultation meeting of the governors never convened, although there
were a number of conference calls, and substantial correspondence was
exchanged. Ultimately, most states approved the proposed diversion
with letters from their respective governors. However, one state did not
respond until mid-December of 1989 and its approval was from a state
agency rather than the governor's office. For this reason, it has been
questioned whether the Pleasant Prairie diversion was ever properly
authorized by all the eight Great Lakes states as required under Section
1109.
12. See WATER RESOURCE MGMT. COMMITTEE, MANAGING THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES BASIN: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS AND PREMIERS OF THE GREAT LAKES
STATES AND PROVINCES (1987).
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The process in securing the Pleasant Prairie diversion was lengthy,
stretching from September 1987 to the end of 1989. Unfortunately, the
region never developed a consensus on how to handle diversion requests
under both Section 1109 and the Great Lakes Charter. Nor has the
controversy regarding this individual diversion gone away. In 1992,
there were investigations into the Pleasant Prairie diversion regarding
alleged additional unauthorized diversions, and questions whether the
initial diversion commenced without the approval required under Section
1109.13
B. Case Study: Lowell, Indiana Diversion Proposal
On October 31, 1990, Governor Evan Bayh of Indiana requested
approval of a small diversion of Lake Michigan water for the town of
Lowell, Indiana. The situation was similar to the Wisconsin case in that
Lowell's current groundwater supply violated federal water quality
standards, placing Lowell under a compliance order of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency to correct the violation. In its analysis
of proposed options, Lowell concluded that the most cost-effective, long-
term water supply solution would be to purchase water from the Gary-
Hobart Water Company, which withdraws water from Lake Michigan.
The proposed diversion was smaller than Pleasant Prairie's, starting out
at 600,000 gpd, and increasing to about 1.1 mgd."' After initial
comments by states, provinces, and other interested groups, the Water
Resources Management Committee held a consultation meeting
pursuant to the prior notice and consultation process. Thereafter, the
matter was elevated to the Executive Committee of the Council of Great
Lakes Governors for further discussion and resolution. Over the next
year, there were numerous conference calls and negotiations between
Indiana and other interested states. Finally, on May 5, 1992, a role call
vote was taken under both Section 1109 and under the Charter. The
State of Michigan cast a negative vote under Section 1109 which
immediately killed the proposal. All other states present voted
affirmatively. For the role call vote under the Charter (now a mute
point following the vote under section 1109), Michigan and the provinces
of Ontario and Quebec voted against the diversion. All of the other
states supported the proposal with the exception of New York, which
was absent. After almost two years of exchange of information,
13. Arlene Jensen, DNR Investigating Lake Water Diversion, KENOSHA NEWS,
Dec. 21, 1991, Local/State at 30.
14. TOWN OF LOWELL, LAKE MICHIGAN WATER DIVERSION PRoposAL (1991).
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correspondence, discussion and negotiation regarding specifics of the
proposal, the region could not come to a consensus over whether a very
small diversion for public water supply purposes should be allowed.
IV. PERSPECTIVE OF A DIVERSION MANAGER
Illinois has been diverting water from Lake Michigan for almost 150
years. What began as a small diversion to allow navigation between the
Great Lakes system and the Illinois and Mississippi River system has
expanded so that today over five and a half million residents of
northeastern Illinois depend on Illinois' diversion of Lake Michigan
water to meet their water supply needs. The Chicago metropolitan
region is in a location where the Lake Michigan drainage area is very
small. It was inevitable as the Chicago area grew and prospered that
Lake Michigan water would be required to supply needs outside the
basin. In addition, the water quality impacts resulting from a growing
population along the southern end of Lake Michigan, which has no
natural outlet, necessitated the diversion of sanitary effluent away from
the Lake. While the quantity aspects of the Chicago diversion have been
discussed through the years, little has been said regarding the water
quality benefits resulting from the diversion. Imagine what the water
quality of the southern half of Lake Michigan would be today if over the
last 90 years the Chicago metropolitan area, with a population base
exceeding 5 million people, had discharged its treated effluent into that
closed basin area. There is no question that had Illinois not reversed
the flow of the Chicago and Calumet Rivers, thus beginning one of the
most controversial water resource projects of this century, the Chicago
area would not have grown and prospered.
Illinois' diversion has been and will continue to be solely for the
benefit of its citizens. The current water conservation requirements
imposed upon all users of Lake Michigan water 5 are in full
conformance with the goals and principles outlined in the Great Lakes
Charter calling for the efficient and wise use of Great Lakes water
resources.
The region needs to refocus its efforts on restoring the original
strategy that led to the development of the Charter, that is, the states
should look to Congress to strengthen the ability of the region to resist
any unwise use of Great Lakes water for diversion to another part of the
country. The principles and guidelines of the Great Lakes Charter and
the prior notice and consultation process provide an excellent
15. Ill. Dep't of Transp., Rules and Regulations for the Allocation of Water from Lake
Michigan, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 730.307 (1990).
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mechanism for the region to review proposals for larger diversions and
consumptive uses within the Great Lakes region. Allowing any Great
Lakes governor to have an absolute veto over every proposed diversion
regardless of its size or impact will guarantee continued diversion of the
region and will hamper its ability to cooperatively address far more
significant problems than whether a town just outside the basin should
be allowed to use Great Lakes water to meet its domestic water supply
needs.

